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I.  Introduction
The relationship between environmental standards and trade is at the forefront of
policy debate. Disputes over linkages between trade and the environment have intensified
over the past decade. The Seattle Ministerial of the World Trade Organization in 1999
ended in failure, at least in part, due to profound differences over the tying of
environmental performance to market access.
Most of those who fear that lenient environmental regulations would lead to
specialization in dirty industries in developing countries rest their arguments on the
“factor abundance” concept promoted by trade theory. According to this argument,
environment is treated as a factor of production that is directly used for agricultural and
industrial production as input or that the environment is degraded through air and water
pollution as an end product of production processes. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, if it
is extended to this context, suggests that countries which are environmentally abundant
will, under a free trade regime, specialize in pollution intensive goods.
Environmental abundance can take two forms; it could simply mean that a
country has a  large  natural assimilative capacity. This could be the case in countries that
are still in the very early stages of industrialization. In this case, countries could tolerate
higher emission levels relative to other countries, and could be characterized as
“environmentally abundant”. Environmental abundance could also be a direct result of
lax environmental regulations and policies which emphasize economic growth at the cost
of the environment. A country’s relative environmental abundance could be increased
further, if it was paralleled by the imposition of stringent environmental regulations by
other countries that produce similar goods.3
 Investigating the impact of environmental polices on trade patterns is important
for two reasons; first, if environmental abundance is created merely by regulation, then
there is room for limiting such a trend, possibly through international agreements, or by
increasing public awareness of the issue.  Second, an argument that has been frequently
used by industries is to exert pressure on governments in developed countries to hinder
imposition of stringent regulations, or to gain concessions from developing countries on
environmental regulations.
If such a correlation does exist, then there is a need for coordination among
developed and developing countries to prevent the  so called “race to the bottom.”
However, if lax environmental regulations do not serve as an incentive for industries,
then developing countries should refrain from providing environmental concessions in
hopes of enhancing their own industries or by promoting foreign investment in such
industries.
This paper examines how the stringency of environmental regulations affects
international trade patterns.  It explores the hypothesis that lax environmental regulations
foster specialization in pollution intensive goods, which is particularly relevant to
developing countries.  We develop a model that complies with industries that differ in
their pollution intensity.  The industries examined are mining, metals, pulp and paper,
steel, and chemicals. Our hypothesis can be associated with a Rybczynski theorem, which
holds that less restrictive regulations on air and water pollution translate to an abundant
endowment of these factors.4
II. Trade and Environmental Regulation
Concerns over the link between environmental standards and trade patterns
mostly rest on the concept of "factor abundance", and that its impact on international
trade was promoted by trade theory. Environmental abundance can take two forms; it
could simply mean that a country has a large natural assimilative capacity, which could
be the case in countries that are still at very early stages of industrialization. Such
countries may still have very low concentrations of pollutants in their air and water that
would allow them to adopt lax environmental policies without posing any health hazards
to the population. The other form of environmental abundance, which has received
increased attention, is the one which results from lenient environmental regulations and
policies. Environmental abundance could be created by policies that are adopted with the
intention of attracting certain industries, without accounting for costs to human health
and natural resources.
The growing concern over implementation of lenient environmental polices,
especially by developing countries, has triggered an increasing number of empirical
studies.  While the majority of economic literature investigates the link between trade and
the stringency of environmental regulations, others have focused on the concepts of
factor abundance and comparative advantage. One can highlight at least two approaches
that appear on economic research on the issue.
 Some research has explored this issue through investigating the factors that
determine industry location and whether environmental regulations have influenced
offshore investment decisions.  The primary question underlining these studies is: Can
environmental regulations serve as an incentive or disincentive for foreign pollution5
intensive industries to immigrate?  These types of studies are mostly concerned with the
possibility of flight by pollution-intensive industries from developed to developing
countries. However, the industry flight hypothesis is not supported by empirical evidence.
Pearson (1987) and Leonard (1988) have found no significant evidence for the
industry flight hypothesis.  Pearson found that there is no reason to believe that benefits
arising from lax environmental regulations would be captured by foreign investors as
opposed to local industry. Similarly, Leonard presents case studies of Foreign Direct
Investment in Ireland, Mexico, and Romania and examines trade data and investment
statistics.  He finds no evidence that environmental regulations have altered plant location
decisions.  Factors such as the level of training of  labour, infrastructure, and stability
were much more important location decisions (Dean, 1992).
Lucas, et al investigates whether environmental regulations in OECD have led to
the displacement of dirty industries to developing countries.  While noting that isolating
and testing the direct impact of environmental regulations on production relocation is
difficult, the authors tried to track any differences in trends of growth of emissions
relative to GDP, among countries across differing time periods.  They tested the pollution
intensity trend for a large sample of countries for three time periods.  They found that
growth in toxic intensity has been far more rapid in developing countries than in
developed countries, suggesting that the implementation of progressively strict
environmental regulations in OECD countries have led to significant location
displacement of pollution intensive industries variation for three periods (Lucas, 1990).
Levinson (1996) uses the industrial location approach to measure the effect of
state environmental regulations on new manufacturing plant locations in the U.S.  He6
uses establishment-level data on location choice and pollution abatement costs.  He uses
two separate indices that were developed to measure environmental performance of state
governments, along with other factors that affect industrial location decisions, including
industry abatement costs, business taxes, wages, energy costs, and roads.  He uses a logit
model which measures the effect of these factors on the probability that a new industry
plant would open in a certain state.  He finds little evidence that stringent state
environmental regulations deter new plants from opening. These findings are surprising
given that the industries covered had an average abatement cost of 4 percent, which is not
too small to affect location decisions. Levinson points out that firms operating in a
number of states may operate according to the most stringent environmental regulations
in all locations eliminating the necessity of designing different production processes for
each specific location.
The other line of research treats environmental regulations as a production factor
that can alter production and consequently trade patterns. This type of research is more
concerned with the specialization in pollution intensive goods that arise in developing
countries as a result of lax environmental regulations,  potentially by domestic industries
and multinationals. In theory, environmental abundance could trigger specialization in
pollution intensive goods.  Environment is treated as a factor of production (just like
labor and capital), and countries that are environmentally abundant will, under a free
trade regime, specialize in pollution intensive goods.
This industrial specialization hypothesis was examined by numerous recent
studies (Tobey 1990, Low and Yeats 1992, Grossman and Krueger 1993,  Xu 1999).
They analyze the link between trade and environmental regulations by treating7
environment as a production factor whose abundance would create a comparative
advantage in producing “environment intensive goods”.
Tobey (1990) employs a cross section Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model to
investigate whether domestic environmental regulations have an impact on international
trade patterns.  The model uses data on international trade in five pollution intensive
industries for 23 countries.   Tobey defines pollution intensive commodities as, “the
products of industries whose direct and indirect abatement costs in the U.S. are equal to
or greater than 1.85 percent of totals costs.” According to the author the point 1.85
percent is used because it results—when the commodities are aggregated—in a set of five
industries that are generally considered the most polluting; mining, primary nonferrous
metals, paper and pulp, primary iron and steel, and chemicals.  He finds no evidence that
environmental regulations have caused trade patterns to deviate from predictions of the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model.  In other words, other factor endowments such as
physical and human capital still play the major role in determining countries trade
patterns (Low and Yeats, 1992).
Low and  Yeats use the comparative advantage approach to investigate trade
trends in trade in “environmental sensitive goods” in developed and developing countries.
A country’s comparative advantage in a certain industry is measured by the share of that
industry in total exports, relative to the industry’s share in total world export
manufactures.  They study trade trends in pollution intensive goods for a large sample of
developed and developing countries between 1965 and 1988.  They find that “dirty
industries” account for a large growing share of exports of some developing countries,
and a decreasing share of exports of developed countries.  The authors have emphasized8
that their model and the aggregated data does not allow isolation and capturing the effect
of environmental regulations on the observed trade trends.
Grossman and Krueger (1993) investigate the environmental impact of North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  They regress 1987 data on US imports from
Mexico in 135 industries using factor shares, which indicate different factor intensities
for each industry.  They measure environmental intensity by using the ratio of pollution
abatement costs to the total value added to a specific US industry.  They found no
evidence that a competitive advantage is being created by lenient environmental
regulations in Mexico.  The traditional determinants of trade and investment came out
significant.
Xu (1999) uses an extended gravity equation framework to test whether
differences in environmental regulations have affected patterns of bilateral trade between
a sample of developed and developing countries in pollution intensive Goods.   He
defines POLLUTION INTENSIVE  GOODs as products of industries that incurred
pollution control costs in the U.S. of approximately 1 percent or more of the value of
their total sales in 1988. This definition results in four industries; iron and steel, metal
manufactures, cement, and agriculture chemicals.  The framework uses a stringency
index of environmental regulations developed by the Dasgupta et al. (1995) that measures
the relative “environment stock” in each country.  He found no evidence that countries
with stricter environmental standards lower their total exports of pollution intensive
goods.
This study belongs to the second type of literature.  We are more concerned with
production specialization patterns, which are assumed to be reflected in trade patterns9
whether they are caused by FDI, or is just simply increased domestic investment in the
industries which we are concerned with.  Therefore, we utilize the cross-section
multifactor HOV model that incorporates a measure of environmental endowment to test
whether or not exports of pollution intensive goods are negatively correlated with the
stringency of environmental regulations.  The implicit assumption here is that more
stringent environmental regulations reflect environmental scarcity.  Clearly, the major
data constraint that dictated our choice of the countries to study was the environmental
stringency variable.  We have made use of the World Bank indices developed by
Dasgupta et al. (which were also used by Xu) as a measure of the environment stock.
These indices measure the status of environmental policy and performance using a
UNCED survey of 31 countries.  Tobey studied five pollution intensive industries;
mining, primary nonferrous metals, paper and pulp, primary iron and steel, and
chemicals.
III.  The Measure of Stringency of Environmental Regulation and Model
Specification
An index of stringency in environmental regulation was developed by Dasgupta et
al. (1995). A higher score in the index reflects more stringent environmental standards.
The authors have randomly selected 31 UNCED reports from a total of 145 (see
Table 2A, p.  6).  These 31 countries range from highly industrialized to extremely poor.
They are drawn from every world region, and they range in size and diversity from China
to Jamaica.10
Based on these reports, they conducted a survey that considers the state of policy
and performance in four environmental dimensions: Air, Water, Land and Living
Resources.  We analyzed the apparent state of policy as it affects the interactions between
these four environmental dimensions and five activity categories: Agriculture, Industry,
Energy, Transport and the Urban Sector.  Although many overlaps undoubtedly exist, we
attempt to draw a separate assessment for the interaction of each activity category with
each environmental dimension.
The survey assessment uses twenty five questions to categorize the state of (i)
environmental awareness; (ii) scope of policies adopted; (iii) scope of legislation enacted;
(iv) control mechanisms in place; and (v) the degree of success in implementation. The
status in each category is graded  High, Medium, or Low, with assigned values of 2, 1
and 0, respectively.  For each UNCED country report, all twenty-five questions are
answered, and then the scores are developed for each country.
They compute four composite indices by adding scores within each environmental
dimension.  They also calculate a total score to provide a composite index of the state of
environmental policy and performance.
Table 1 shows the composite scores assigned to the countries subject to our study.
Germany has the highest score at 951 that is approximately higher than Malawi that has
the lowest score at 352.  The highest five countries are all in West Europe whereas the
lowest five countries are in Africa or South Asia.  This suggest a correlation between
stage of development and stringency of environmental regulation.11
Table 1. Index of the environmental regulations stringency in 24 countries
Country Env Country Env
Germany 951 India 507
Switzerland 947 Brazil 493
Netherlands 900 Jordan 474
Finland 894 Kenya 463
Ireland 871 Thailand 449
Bulgaria 750 Philippines 447
Korea 686 Paraguay 443
Jamaica 633 Egypt, Arab Rep. 441
South Africa 619 Zambia 439
Tunisia 589 Mozambique 378
Trinidad and Tobago 564 Bangladesh 366
China 529 Malawi 352
Source: Dasgupta et al. (1995).
A high correlation is also found between stage of development and capital labor
ratio.  Table 2 shows ranking of countries with respect to capital labor ratio.  The highest
five countries are the same as those in Table 1.  Four countries of the lowest five are in
the lowest five in Table 1.  As Nordstrom (2001) indicates, correlation between capital
labor ratio and stringency of environmental regulation is high.  Since many manufacture
industries are capital intensive, this correlation can prevent us from observing potential
relationship between stringency of environmental regulation and exports.  This problem
perhaps tends to be more apparent in Chemicals Industries, which require more advanced
technology and capital investment, and less apparent in Mining Industry, which requires
simpler technology and more labor inputs.
In order to mitigate the effect of this correlation on the regression analysis, we
divide the sample into four groups which are ranked by capital intensity.12
Table 2. Capital and Labor Ratio in 24 Countries ($ 1,000/worker)
Croup Country Group Country
1 Switzerland 85.99 3 Jamaica 4.84
Germany 65.86 Paraguay 4.70
Netherlands 50.50 Bulgaria 3.15
Finland 48.55 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.57
Ireland 33.78 Philippines 2.49
Korea 28.36 China 1.06
2 Brazil 9.13 4 India 0.78
South Africa 7.76 Bangladesh 0.53
Trinidad and Tobago 7.37 Zambia 0.52
Thailand 6.48 Kenya 0.47
Tunisia 6.15 Malawi 0.41
Jordan 5.88 Mozambique 0.24
Source: Authors’ calculation from the World Development Indicator (World Bank)
We estimate the relationship between the stringency of environmental regulation
and the country’s exports in polluting industries using a regression method.  We use an
index of the stringency of environmental regulation developed by the World Bank in this
analysis.  Our study extends the scope of  Tobey’s study by expanding the chemical
industries into three sub-industries; Inorganic Chemicals, Organic Chemicals, and
Plastics.  These industries are:
Mining : SITC (Revision 1) 281, 283
Primary metals : 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 689
Pulp and waste paper : 251, 641, 642
Primary iron and steel : 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678
Inorganic chemicals : 513, 514
Organic chemicals : 512
Plastics: 58113
The analysis employs trade data on these industries from 24 developed and
developing countries for which the World Bank has environmental regulation data
available.  We use a regression model based on the HOV model but with gross exports
for dependent variable instead of net exports.
The regression model for an individual industry is specified as follows:
(1)  
t j t j t j t j
t j t j t j t j t j t j
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2
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where the subscripts j and t denote country and year,  Y  is the value of exports (US$
million) in country j in the year t.  Capital stock (cap), labor (lab), coal (coal), oil (oil)
and arable land (arland) are included as they measure resource endowments of a country.
Secondary school enrollment rate (schl) is included in our model, as it measures the
quality of labor.  The variable env is the stringency measure of environmental regulation.
The quadratic term of  env is included to capture the decreasing marginal effect of
environmental regulation.  Dummy variables for  subregions 1 to 3,  D1 to  D3, are
included to control the capital intensity effect on exports.  These variables were obtained
for the five-year period between 1994 and 1998.
The parameter 0 b  is the estimated coefficient for the intercept term.  1 b  to  8 b  are
the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables.  01 b   to  03 b   are estimated
coefficients for the dummy variables. The term t j, e  is the error term.
Capital stock (in US$ billion) is computed as an accumulated and discounted
gross domestic investment flow in constant 1995 US dollars since 1980, assuming an14
average life of 15 years, and a constant depreciation rate of 13.3 percent per year.
1  Labor
(in millions of people) is computed as the number of workers in labor force who meet the
International Labor Organization definition of the economically active population: all
people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified
period.  It includes both the employed and the unemployed.  While national practices
vary in the treatment of such groups as the armed forces and seasonal or part-time
workers, in general, the labor force includes the armed forces, the unemployed, and first-
time job-seekers.  Arable land measures the area of arable land in hectares.  Arable land
includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas
are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or
kitchen gardens, and land left temporarily fallow.  The value of the production of primary
solid fuel in U.S dollars is used to measure the endowment of coal.  The value of oil and
gas production in US dollars is used to measure oil endowment.
The variable schl follows the definition of International Standard Classification of
Education on net secondary school enrollment ratio.  It is the ratio (in percent) of the
number of children of official school age (as defined by the national education system)
who are enrolled in school, to the population of the corresponding official school age.
Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary
level, and aims to lay the foundation for lifelong learning and human development, by
offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction, with more specialized teachers.
Data on capital, labor and secondary school enrollment were obtained from the
World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  Data on oil gas production (in
                                               
1 See Maskus (1991) for the discussion on this approach.15
millions of barrels), and coal (in millions of short tons) were obtained from the US
Department of Energy USDOE database.
IV. Results
The linear model in (1) is first estimated for the seven pollution intensive good
exports using an ordinary-least square (OLS) method.  Since the variance of the error
term is likely to differ across countries, we tested for heteroscedasticity using the Cook
and Weisberg (1983) test.  The squared residuals from the OLS models were regressed on
the fitted value.  The test rejected homoscedasticity of the model for all studied exports at
one percent level.  Instead of identifying the sources of heteroscedasticity, we corrected
for  heteroscedasticity by weighting the observations by the square root of the OLS
estimated variances from the individual country.
2  The results of this weighted least
squares (WLS) method are reported in Table 3.
The results indicate negative and significant relationships between the stringency
of environmental regulation and exports in four of the seven industries;  Non-Ferrous
Metals, Pulp and Paper, and the Inorganic and Organic Chemicals industries.  The
quadratic term of this variable in the regressions for these industries are also significant.
The Iron and Steel industry exhibit the opposite signs to these variables.  The positive
sign implies a decreasing marginal effect of environmental regulation.  No significance is
found for these variables in the regressions for the Mining and Plastics industries.
Overall, these results are not sufficiently strong to support the hypothesis that lax
environmental regulation promotes all kinds of pollution intensive good exports.  But,
they suggest that there are some industries that exhibit this relationship.  One of the
                                               
2 See Greene (1992) for the detail of this method.16
crucial difficulties that previous studies have faced, was the strong correlation between
capital intensity, and the stringency of environmental regulation. Grouping of samples
with respect to capital intensity, and allowing different intercept terms for the groupings
seems to help reveal this relationship.Table 3. FGLS Coefficient Estimates for 7 Pollution Intensive Good Exports
Mining NFMetals Pulp/Paper Iron&Steel Inorg.chem Plastics Org.Chem
Capital -0.06** 1.30*** 2.95*** 5.54*** 3.57*** 5.55*** 2.77***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.23) (0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.20)
Labor -11.70*** 1.94*** -5.73*** -13.56*** 5.84*** 6.74*** 5.15***
(0.88) (0.61) (1.32) (2.36) (1.60) (2.26) (1.50)
Coal 0.96*** 0.63*** 1.37*** 4.54*** 0.01 -2.07*** -0.92**
(0.23) (0.18) (0.46) (0.85) (0.48) (0.58) (0.43)
Oil 3.53*** -0.68*** 0.04 0.39* -0.97*** -2.72*** -0.89***
(0.46) (0.11) (0.21) (0.22) (0.35) (0.72) (0.32)
Land 25.64*** -7.09*** 7.17*** 17.59*** -13.33*** -18.63*** -8.81***
(1.87) (1.18) (2.66) (4.75) (3.09) (4.35) (2.74)
School 7.01*** 6.69*** 3.36** 0.56 19.43*** 14.03** 16.83***
(2.36) (1.40) (1.60) (3.29) (4.28) (5.55) (4.03)
Env -1.18 -9.37*** -14.45*** 13.09*** -26.65*** -3.11 -22.60***
(2.34) (1.72) (3.23) (4.68) (4.12) (3.93) (3.44)
Env
2 0.0002 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.03*** 0.003 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D1 142.45 -665.09 724.82* 1514.92*** -522.16 -15.51 705.63*
(110.04) (159.45) (393.08) (550.82) (490.96) (397.36) (374.17)
D2 173.88* -6.56 -20.68 -311.54** -38.34 -71.02 -30.34
(100.30) (40.22) (65.81) (144.32) (102.58) (166.70) (82.04)
D3 94.92 3.36 -82.92* -283.94** -160.82 -53.22 -118.02
(120.55) (35.02) (48.38) (131.36) (112.62) (160.46) (88.56)
Intercept 83.86 2125.49*** 3567.66*** -3320.47*** 5449.14*** 74.43 4822.27***
(659.92) (421.16) (830.48) (1171.93) (966.67) (915.94) (793.89)
Log-likelihood -433.32 -544.66 -713.64 -668.12 -686.89 -663.16 -668.88
Chi-square (d.f.=11) 347.06 913.69 818.56 969.34 1584.95 619.92 1566.15
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of
observations
83 99 116 103 103 103 102
Note: Inside parentheses are standard errors.  Notations “*”, “**”and “***” signify significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent levels based on a two-tailed test, respectively.Reference
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